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The purpose of this paper is to provide a response to Harrison’s (2012) work. 
The author highlights the positives associated with many of the academic reform 
efforts Harrison highlights (i.e., the good); addresses concerns about academic 
clustering, rewarding teams performing at high academic levels, and athletic 
administrators’ resistance to upset the status quo (i.e., the problematic); and the 
strong association between efforts for academic reform and large revenue streams 
found in men’s basketball and football (i.e., the truly worrisome). Recommenda-
tions and conclusions are advanced.
The Good
There is a lot to like in Dr. Harrison’s (2012) comprehensive account of the recent 
work of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Committee on Aca-
demic Performance (CAP), which he chairs, that is charged, as its name suggests, 
with bolstering the academic achievement of student athletes, especially those of 
Division I men’s football and basketball. To begin, the Committee’s guiding aims 
to improve the academic performance of these intercollegiate athletes by rewarding 
them for their academic successes rather than merely penalizing them and their 
home athletic departments for their failures, and to do so without having a disparate 
impact on the ethnic minorities that make up a large percentage of men’s football 
and basketball, are entirely laudable goals. Further, the Committee’s adoption of 
new metrics such as the Graduate Success Rate (GSR), which replaces the Federal 
Graduation Rate (FGR), and the Academic Progress Rate (APR), which provides a 
contemporaneous measure of the academic performance of student athletes, goes 
a long way in remedying some of the well-known problems that plagued the old 
metrics used by the NCAA in this regard. Equally noteworthy are CAP’s com-
mitment to use the best data available in formulating their policies, and to probe 
further both the intended and unintended consequences of the policies they put forth. 
Finally, the new eligibility requirements CAP proposed for student athletes, which 
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created an “academic redshirt” group for academically at-risk athletes that allows 
them to receive athletically based financial aid but forbids them from competing 
and traveling to away games, and for student athletes who transfer from two-year 
colleges, which raised their required grade point average (GPA) and strengthened 
their core academic subjects, and finally for postseason competition, which penal-
ized academic underperforming players by limiting practice time and replacing it 
with academic activities, are all welcome developments to say the least.
The Problematic
However, the prospect for accomplishing the sort of genuine academic reform of 
intercollegiate athletics at the Division I level proposed in Dr. Harrison’s (2012) 
paper looks much less promising as soon as one considers the economic climate in 
which high-profile college sports currently operate. Several hard to miss problems 
surface when the work of CAP is so situated, all of which can be traced to strategic 
responses by the NCAA member institutions, mainly, but not exclusively, initiated 
by their respective athletic departments to inoculate themselves against meaningful 
academic reforms that threaten their financial bottom line.
The first such problematic area is the evident clustering of football players 
into less academically demanding majors—a development discussed by university 
presidents at a summit hosted by NCAA president Mark Emmert, to meet the new 
more strenuous academic benchmarks put in place by CAP. For example, a recent 
Associated Press survey of 68 colleges in conferences that receive automatic bids 
to the Bowl Championship Series, which also included Notre Dame and soon to 
be Big East member TCU, showed that over half engage in such clustering—at 22 
schools, to be yet more precise, 50% or more of football players pursued degrees 
in 3 majors (Newberry, 2011, p. 1).1
A second dark cloud on the academic horizon of intercollegiate athletics can be 
found in Dr. Harrison’s (2012) paper itself. I am referring to the committee’s already 
noted desire to reward athletic teams that are performing at a high academic level. 
The initial discussions of CAP focused on allocating “direct financial rewards” for 
teams that score high on the APR. But the member institutions themselves torpedoed 
that idea. The reason for their opposition was, in Dr. Harrison’s own words, that 
“any allocation of NCAA funds for this purpose would have been a reallocation 
from some other intended or planned use” (p. 71). That such reallocation of NCAA 
funds would be required to achieve this purpose is plain to see; what is not so plain 
to see, however, is why any member institution would think this is a reason, let 
alone a good one, not to financially reward academically high performing athletic 
programs. In the end, CAP decided to recognize publicly teams with APRs in the 
top 10% for that sport—hardly a resounding victory for those seeking meaningful 
change on the academic front.
The third trouble spot once again had to do with the reticence of NCAA member 
institutions to upset the status quo. This time around, the matter was the all-important 
one of athletic scholarships, which are presently one-year offers renewable at the 
sole discretion of coaches. Recently, President Emmert, with the full backing of 
the NCAA Board of Directors, proposed giving colleges the option of offering a 
four-year athletic scholarship. The importance of this change for improving the 
academic lot of football and basketball players and their peers is obvious even 
92  Morgan
to the casual observer. But yet again member institutions rebelled and enough of 
them, mainly at the behest of their athletic representatives and conference com-
missioners, signed on to an override petition that forced the NCAA to withdraw 
the four-year scholarship option. Their reasoning in this case was as shallow and 
as self-serving as the previous one. The following two objections to the four-year 
scholarship proposal obtained from an internal NCAA document by a lawyer 
who specializes in sports law clear up any doubt as to why they killed this option: 
“The new coach may have a completely different style of offense/defense that the 
student no longer fits into.” In the same vein, another institutional defender of the 
athletics-first academics-be-dammed agenda argued that the four-year scholarship 
option might result in the school being forced to provide financial aid to “someone 
that is of no ‘athletic usefulness’ to the program” (Nocera, 2011, p. A21). So much 
for the effort to fortify the student part of the student-athlete equation.
The Truly Worrisome
What accounts for this pushback from member institutions and their athletic coun-
terparts to such good faith and entirely reasonable efforts to boost the academic 
prowess of the student athlete is no mystery. The short answer, which is also the 
long answer, is the huge revenue stream that men’s football and basketball pres-
ently command. The numbers are truly staggering, and there is no reason to think 
they will not remain so as long as the media is willing, an understatement if there 
ever was one, and able to pay the eye-popping broadcast fees that underwrite the 
college football and basketball enterprise. This financial windfall obviously does 
not bode well for the reform measures CAP and the NCAA Board of Directors have 
in mind for these sports, since they are simply no match for the financial forces and 
incentives that actually drive the behavior of NCAA member institutions and that 
presently constitute the culture of intercollegiate sports. That means not only that 
CAP’s new rewards-based, nonpunitive, approach to academic reform is doomed to 
failure, but as well its beefed-up punitive approach to institute more effective penal-
ties to deter academic underperformance. When you add to this disquieting picture 
the fact that the NCAA enforcement division is woefully understaffed (it presently 
is made up of around 55 individuals or so to oversee over a 1,000 colleges) and 
lacks not only subpoena power but even the ability to hold those accountable who 
do testify but do so falsely (it lacks legal authority to charge such truth-shredders 
with perjury) and finally, as a consequence of its weak legal standing, is forced 
to rely mainly on the self-reporting of violations by member institutions, there is 
little question who is going to win this battle over the academic heart and soul of 
intercollegiate athletics. Here is a hint: it will not be the good guys.
My skepticism about the prospects for this new wave of academic reform suc-
ceeding, however, does not mean I think the forces behind this reform initiative 
should surrender to the powers that be, that they should waive the white flag and 
give up on the idea that intercollegiate sports can be redeemed academically or 
otherwise. I will not be arguing then for the professionalization of college sports, 
for the view that we might as well formally recognize and sanction them for what 
they have ostensibly become, namely, professional sports masquerading as amateur 
ones to deprive student athletes of their just market share. For what is at stake here 
is not primarily the market share of the producers of this athletic wealth, the players, 
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but the value of intercollegiate sports with close ties to educational institutions 
whose main goals sit uneasily, if at all, with the unbridled pursuit of the almighty 
dollar. In short, educational institutions are not and should not be markets, nor are 
or should be the social practices conducted in their name, despite the undeniable 
entrepreneurial turn most of them have taken of late, in the desperate search for 
cash to keep their athletic ambitions viable. This is a large claim that requires a 
large argument, which I cannot give here. But I would like to sketch out ever so 
briefly why I think colleges and college sports should resist the temptation to let 
the money-changers in their midst control their athletic agenda. For if that were to 
happen, then everything about college sports, to include, of course, their academic 
standing, would be lost.
But before I do so, however, I need to answer a powerful objection to my 
proposal to change wholesale the culture of Division I intercollegiate sports. It is a 
powerful objection because it is an entirely plausible one given how things presently 
stand. That objection is simply that any effort to chase the money changers out of 
the temple of these sports is at best a quixotic gesture and at worst a hopelessly 
naïve pipedream. And here my own previous words seem to speak against me, since 
I have just admitted that the economic titans that presently control college sports 
are much too powerful for CAP and likeminded academic reformers to succeed. 
That would appear to be doubly so for anyone foolish enough to think they can 
somehow dethrone these titans and change not just the academic face of college 
sports but the economic infrastructure upon which they presently rest.
My reply is that I am well aware of what I am arguing for, and no less aware 
that it will not be easy, to court an obvious understatement, to accomplish. But I do 
not think it is either quixotic or mere wishful thinking. That is because the present 
economic foundation of intercollegiate sports is itself shaky to say the least.2 That 
is, it is not a question of whether the economic edifice that supports college sports 
will topple, but only of when it will do so. For despite the ever-growing influx of 
cash into college sports, and the deep pockets of the broadcast media that is the 
main source of this cash, it has not been able to keep up with the profligate spend-
ing of athletic departments on such things as coaches’ salaries, facilities upgrades, 
boosters’ perks, and so on. For instance, of the 120 football programs that comprise 
the Football Bowl Subdivision, which includes such athletic and economic power-
houses as Texas and Florida that generate upward of 40 to $80 million of revenue, 
only 14 are operating in the black. That means 88% of those football programs 
are operating in the red (Davis, 2011, p. 2). But while the great majority of these 
programs are hemorrhaging money, that has not stopped them from continuing 
to try to outdo one another, including their presently well-off 14% competitors, 
to win an athletic arms race that eventually will bankrupt all of them. To put it 
bluntly, what we have here is the makings of an economic calamity. My argument 
is not only that this makes the move to professionalize intercollegiate sports and 
pay players for athletic services rendered a bad practical idea in addition to being 
a bad idea period, but that it gives us good reason now rather than later to seek to 
change the market culture of these sports.
But why is the notion of professionalizing college sports a bad idea in itself, 
that is, incompatible with the ostensible educational aims of institutions of higher 
education. My necessarily short answer is that markets are what the philosopher 
Gauthier (1986) calls zones of “mutual unconcern.” What Gauthier means by this 
94  Morgan
provocative phrase is that markets are nothing if not self-regarding mechanisms 
in which the self-interests of market actors trump everything else. That does not 
mean, of course, that market actors take no interest in one another, but only that the 
interest they take in others and their actions is predicated exclusively on furthering 
their own self-interests, in ensuring they end up getting what they want. Ayn Rand, 
the great godmother of unbridled capitalism, captures well what Gauthier was get-
ting at here. She writes, “Many words have been granted me, . . . but only three are 
holy; ‘I will it!. . . Whatever road I take, the guiding star is within me; the guiding 
star and lodestone which point the way. They point in but one direction. They point 
at me” (as quoted in Midgley, 1991, p. 98). Here in a nutshell is the problem with 
monetizing colleges and their athletic programs; it encourages individuals and insti-
tutions to see themselves as self-subsistent units, and to regard their self-subsistence 
and the self-regarding ways that are its signature feature as something to protect 
and hang on to, as a badge of honor, that is not to be compromised or weakened 
in our interactions with others. In short, it encourages individuals and institutions 
to retreat within themselves, and so, to view dependence on others as a bad rather 
than a good thing. One especially pernicious feature of such insularity is a general 
suspicion of any project or initiative that transcends such self-interests, that calls 
on agents and institutions to become part of something larger than themselves and 
their parochial aspirations–especially if such endeavors require reining in one’s 
private aims as CAP’s reforms clearly do. By contrast, educational institutions 
rightly understood aim to broaden our horizons, to expand and transform our self-
understanding, to engage us in endeavors whose main point is to get us to see our 
lives from a less insular and parochial perspective. It is no accident that college 
mission statements are burnished with just such self-enlarging rhetoric, whether to 
promote good citizenship, or service learning, or good sportspersonship.
So construed, colleges have much more in common with social unions such 
as friendship and marriage, in which, as Hegel (1977) put it, the point is “to count 
for something in the other,” and for that “other in turn . . . to count for something 
in me” (p. 261), than they do with the egoistic, self-interested perspective of the 
market. And like good friends and marriage partners, neither of whom regard their 
previous self-subsistence as something to cling to but as a defect or deficiency, a 
sign of their own incompleteness, and neither of whom regard their commitment 
to their partners as a limitation on their own freedom but as fulfillment of it, col-
leges and college sports are at their best zones of “mutual concern,” rather than 
“mutual unconcern,” in which the welfare of others is of paramount importance 
and projects that emphasize shared goals over those that emphasize private ones 
are actively promoted. It is in this sense that self-subsistence and self-regarding 
actions look less like virtues and more like vices, and ones we would do well to 
overcome rather than protect with all our might.
Critical Postscript
A critic might reproach me here for trying to pass off what looks like a new, educa-
tionally slanted argument for walling off intercollegiate sports from the long arms 
of the market, but which is in fact just another old and tired defense of the much 
and rightly maligned amateur ideal. That is, the objection is that my antimarket take 
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on college sports makes me simply another apologist for the athletic status quo, in 
which under the guise of amateurism, this time disguised as an educational ideal, 
athletes in high-profile sports are cajoled to work for free so that athletic departments 
and their respective universities can turn a hefty profit. Critics of the amateur ideal 
bristle with contempt for those who push this purist creed, especially the breath-
taking hypocrisy of their vigilant efforts to tamp down the mercenary designs of 
student athletes every chance they get, (e.g., the recent NCAA probe of Auburn’s 
star quarterback Cam Newton’s and his father’s alleged efforts to secure recruit-
ing fees) all the while blithely ignoring the fifteen or so corporate logos festooned 
on Newton’s uniform every football Saturday as part of the university’s $10-plus 
million contract with Under Armour sportswear company (Branch, 2011, p. 16).3
This criticism is not a wildly implausible one, since I readily admit that the 
position I defend here could easily be mistaken as a call for a return to the amateur 
standard in college sports. What is more, I am not entirely sure I find the accusation 
all that damming. For I agree with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 1988 finding 
that although “the NCAA has not distilled amateurism to its purest form . . . [that] 
does not mean its attempts to maintain a mixture containing some amateur ele-
ments are unreasonable (quoted in Branch, 2011, p. 28). Still, I reject the charge 
that I am trying to smuggle amateurism in the back door, because no matter how 
much we might try to rehabilitate the ideal of amateurism, its complete rejection 
of any form of financial remuneration for athletic performance is a non-starter in 
the contemporary setting. Besides, while the ideal I am peddling in this paper is 
unmistakably market-averse, it is not, as I aim to show shortly, averse to non-market 
financial transactions or even to market ones that serve the common good rather 
than the private interests of a few. Rather, the main force of my argument to keep 
the logic of the market at arms length is that college sports are best conceived of 
as a type of intrinsic good, as a cultural practice worth doing ultimately not for the 
sake of some other end, monetary or otherwise, to which it is subordinate, but worth 
doing for its own sake. In other words, my position is that sports pursued under the 
aegis of education should serve as a counter to the kind of crude utilitarian outlook 
that pervades so much of life nowadays, thanks, I contend, to the dominance of the 
market, and that insists there always be some tangible payoff, some useful benefit, 
to anything one chooses to do. As I see it, the lesson college sports teach us at their 
best is not the widespread notion that one should always be on the take, ready to 
seize whatever advantage presents itself to us to get an edge over others, but rather 
to seek a life dedicated to excellence and marked by a fair regard for and respect 
of others. So construed, college sports are best thought of not as private zero-sum 
games, but as public practices whose shared goals can uplift us all so long as we 
do not let the money changers eager to exploit them for private gain have their way.
This conception of college sports as a kind of intrinsic good in which achieving 
genuine excellence rather than simply winning is the point, is, as I have said, market-
averse but not averse to any sort of financial payment for athletic performance that 
serves its perfectionist aspirations. Ensuring that student athletes are paid a stipend 
beyond an athletic scholarship to cover the actual costs of their attendance is a case 
in point. The idea here is not that athletes be paid in proportion to their market 
share, to the large sums of money they bring in, but be sufficiently remunerated so 
that they can devote themselves to their athletic craft and academic commitments 
without having to worry where their next meal is coming from. This notion is not 
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foreign to us academics, who are accustomed to receiving honorariums for giving 
invited talks and the like, in which it is understood our recompense is not meant 
to be commensurate to their actual market value, the number of paying attendees 
our presence might generate, but rather to the scholarly value we add to such occa-
sions, to the academic prestige of these events. Asking for our fair market share 
on such occasions would be viewed as insult all around, as a failure to understand 
both what is the meaning of an honorarium and what is the true value of scholarly 
presentations and inquiry.
Treating the financial stipends college players receive for their participation as 
quasi-honorariums rather than wages does not mean, however, that athletic depart-
ments, university officials, or governing bodies like the NCAA have free reign to 
appropriate the surplus value athletes generate. For they too are, and should be held 
to the same market-averse standard as the athletes themselves, which means they are 
not and should not be in the money-making business but the educational “business” 
of cultivating and encouraging athletic excellence. That means the astronomical 
sums of money high-profile sports bring in should redound to the educational benefit 
of the student athletes themselves and to the educational mission of their athletic 
department and university stewards. This can take many different forms, such as 
investing the profit earned off of college sports in athletic trust funds to ensure more 
student athletes get their degrees, or requiring athletic scholarships be offered on 
a four-year basis rather than as they presently are on a renewable one-year basis. 
That also means that coaches in these high-profile sports be paid a fair market wage, 
rather than the grossly inflated wages and benefits they currently receive thanks 
to the good-old-boy athletic network (mainly boosters and athletic directors) that 
drives up their salaries not to mention those of their administrative heads—after all, 
if the football coach is paid millions of dollars surely the athletic director deserves 
something approximating that figure if only because he, and, rarely, she, is supposed 
to be the coach’s boss (Zimbalist, 1999, p. 83). That coaches be rewarded for their 
academic as well as athletic successes would follow as well. Finally, it means that 
the NCAA start acting like the nonprofit organization it is supposed to be, rather 
than the corporate entity it more often resembles. Running up tabs for chartering 
private aircraft, building palatial headquarters that would be the envy of any CEO, 
and devoting a scant 1% of their budget to enforcement, are not the sort of actions 
one expects of a nonprofit organization whose ostensible reason for existence is to 
ensure the well-being of intercollegiate sports
Conclusion
If I am right that the academic reform of intercollegiate sports cannot be achieved 
without a wholesale change in their culture, then I think we can explain why it is that 
in the absence of such a cultural change NCAA member institutions will continue 
to push back against CAP’s academic reforms, and coaches and their institutional 
surrogates will do the same, and, if necessary, cheat, despite escalating penalties 
and the best efforts of reformers to stop them. For as long as these parties see 
themselves first and foremost as private actors seeking their own private gain, they 
will continue to oppose such reforms and treat the larger educational and athletic 
goals that inform them, and that, in fact, they share in common, with contempt. 
That is why initiatives of the kind CAP and their kindred spirits propose will only 
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succeed if college sports themselves are, in effect, de-professionalized, a tall task 
we should not presently shrink from if only because the present economic course 
of college sports is unsustainable.
Notes
1. It is important to note here that athletes cluster into certain academic majors not just to get 
around stiffer academic requirements, but for a variety of reasons. As Jay Coakley pointed out 
to me in conversation over this matter at the 2012 Colloquium, one important reason especially 
African-American athletes do so, is because they are only made to feel welcome in certain aca-
demic units that are willing to treat them as genuine students, that don’t let their athletic status 
get in the way of their regard for them as students.
2. The weak economic underpinning of intercollegiate sports is not the only threat they face. As 
Branch (2011) has noted, threats loom as well from Congress, the courts (lawsuits filed by athletes 
for damages incurred playing football), university students who faced with the quickly escalating 
cost of higher education are beginning to chafe at paying mandatory fees to support the athletic 
department, and a growing public disgust with the hypocrisy of college sports (p. 6). Aside from 
congressional intervention, after all, the current Congress seems incapable of getting anything 
important done, and possibly public disgust, which seems to vanish when their favorite teams are 
successful, the other threats Branch mentions are indeed real ones. But I remain convinced that 
the shaky finances of college sports is the most ominous threat they face.
3. For the curious among you, Branch details precisely what parts of Newton’s uniform these 
corporate logos were affixed to: one on his jersey, one on his pants, four on his helmet visor, 
one each on his wristbands, six on his shoes, and one on the headband under his helmet (p. 16).
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